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III. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff-Appellee's brief contains several material 
misstatements of fact. Further, Plaintiff's key arguments side-
step the issues raised by Defendant-Appellant in his brief. Th6se 
issues are addressed sequentially below. 
A. DEFENDANT'S JURISDICTIONAL ARGUMENT IS NOT LIMITED 
TO QUESTION OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, AS A 
SIMPLE READING OF THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL ORDER 
PROVES 
At Paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 15, and 16 of Plaintiffs-
Appellee's brief, it is alleged and argued that the issue of 
personal jurisdiction was not properly raised or preserved in the 
trial court below, and that the trial court did not make any 
decision regarding the issue of personal jurisdiction. In fact, 
Plaintiff even refused to address or argue the matter on the merits 
to this Court in her Brief: 
The lower court did not make a decision on the issue of 
personal jurisdiction and therefore the Plaintiff does 
not respond to Defendant's argument regarding the same as 
set forth on pg. 15, subparagraph 4, of the Appellant's 
Brief.... [Emphasis added]. 
Brief of Appellant at 15. 
The simple truth is that the Order of Dismissal (R. 54-55), 
which was "Approved as to Form and content" by Plaintiff's Counsel, 
and then signed by Hon. James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court 
Judge on January 24, 1997, and which is the "final judgment" giving 
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rise to this appeal, holds: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT 
1. Defendant's Petition for Modification of the Divorce 
Decree is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction. [Emphasis added1. 
A copy of this document, from the official record, at R.54, is 
attached to Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief as Exhibit A in the 
Addendum, and is there hi-lited in yellow so that there is no 
possibility of Plaintiff's further misunderstanding that this issue 
of personal jurisdiction was indeed preserved and ruled on just as 
much as was the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CONFUSES THE DOMESTICATING OF 
BACK-SUPPORT JUDGMENT FOR ALIMONY ENFORCEMENT WITH THE 
DOMESTICATION OF HER ENTIRE DIVORCE DECREE IN THE LOWER 
COURT. 
Plaintiff reiterates, and cites cases, in support of a non-
issue. Defendant does not maintain, and never has maintained, that 
domestication of an enforcement order alone somehow transfers full 
jurisdiction to the new venue. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff could and should have limited 
her foreign judgment transfer to the order she wishes enforced in 
Utah, to wit: the Order After Hearing issued by the Superior Court 
of the State of California for the County of San Bernardino on 
April 2, 1996. Instead, she filed the complete Judgment of 
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Dissolution, dated December 5, 1991. 
Defendant's point here is not "distinction without a 
difference." By domesticating all of the divorce, all of the 
divorce is subject to re-opening, vacation, dismissal, and related 
attack in accordance with U.C.A. §78-22a-2(3). 
The mere fact that Plaintiff only seeks enforcement of one 
point of the judgment does not limit Defendant's response to that 
portion of the domesticated divorce which Plaintiff elects to 
pursue. 
C. MODIFICATION VS. REOPENING IS A DISTINCTION WITHOUT 
A DIFFERENCE. 
At Appellee's Brief, p. 12, Plaintiff appears to concede that 
Defendant may "defend, enforce, satisfy, reopen, vacate, set aside, 
or stay the judgment." In the same breath Plaintiff denies that 
Defendant can modify the alimony order. Both propositions appear 
to be unaffected by whether or not the entire Judgment of 
Dissolution has been domesticated, or just the enforcement order 
for alimony. But what is "modification" if not a "re-opening"? If 
the modification seeks to eliminate alimony due to a material 
change in circumstances, as in the instant case, is that not a 
"vacating" of the prior order? Does it not require a "re-opening" 
to get to that point? Is it not a "defense" to Plaintiff's 
enforcement action that Defendant simply has no means or assets 
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left to pay alimony further? Common sense and plain language 
require words to be construed in a reasonable manner. To "modify" 
is to "re-open", "vacate", "defend", etc.. Changed circumstance is 
a valid affirmative defense and appropriate basis for counter-
petition in an action to enforce an alimony judgment. Plaintiff's 
admission that Defendant can "vacate" or "reopen" the alimony 
issue, but cannot seek to "modify" it, makes no sense. 
D. PLAINTIFF'S SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF IN UTAH WHICH 
WAS ALSO AVAILABLE IN CALIFORNIA IS IRRELEVANT. 
Plaintiff, at Appellee's Brief p. 16, attempts to argue that 
she "did not seek additional affirmative relief in Utah that was 
not already available to her in California" in transferring the 
entire Judgment from California to Utah. This non-issue begs the 
question. It is irrelevant that the remedies sought in Utah may 
also have been available in California. Plaintiff cites no 
authority contra. The point remains that Plaintiff domesticated 
the entire Judgment in Utah, thus subjecting the entire Judgment to 
attack or modification in Utah, as argued in Appellant's Brief, 
whether or not those remedies were also available in California. 
E. PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE ON RIMENSBURGER IS MISPLACED 
Plaintiff relies on Rimensburger v. Rimensburger. 841 P.2d 709 
(1992), to establish the proposition that a party wishing to modify 
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a divorce decree must do so in the original forum only. However, 
the facts of Rimensburger are far from the facts in the instant 
case, and Rimensburger is therefore easily distinguishable and not 
good precedent for the instant case. 
Fundamental fact differences include (1) Rimensburger involves 
two judicial districts in Utah, not two separate states where Full 
Faith and Credit and related issues apply, and (2) the party 
wishing to modify in Rimensburger was not dealing with a case which 
had been fully domesticated in Husband's new state. It is one 
thing to simply go to another venue and forum-shop, as Wife did in 
Rimensburger. It is another altogether to respond to a fully 
domesticated case transfer when brought to one's own court in its 
entirety and is subject to being treated in all respects "as a 
judgment of the district court of Utah," (UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22a-
2(2)), as is the situation in the case at hand. 
F. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S RELIANCE ON DATA MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS, INC., IS MISPLACED. 
In her Brief at 13, Appellee relies on the case of Data 
Management Systems, Inc., v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377 (Utah 1985) 
for the proposition that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act does not 
allow Utah courts to re-open or re-examine case from sister states 
absent a showing of fraud or lack of jurisdiction or lack of due 
process in the rendering state. Once again, however, Data 
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Management Svstems Inc. does not involve a case where the entire 
foreign case, not just a judgment or enforcement order, was fully 
domesticated in Utah, as is the case here. Plaintiff's case law 
could be on point were the instant case merely an enforcement 
action. The instant case is a fully domesticated case which now is 
treated in all respects as a Utah judgment under U.C.A. §78-22a-
2(3). 
G. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS DAY IN COURT IN THE 
MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS. 
Plaintiff-Appellee proposed, at 14 and 15 of his Brief, that 
Defendant received equal protection and due process because "he had 
his day in court in the enforcement proceedings." This analysis, 
again, begs the question. The true issue is "should Defendant have 
received his day in court to modify the California decree after the 
entire Judgment, not just the enforcement order, had been 
domesticated in Utah." Again, Plaintiff lumps together two quite 
separate status situations—one where Defendant responds to an 
enforcement order, and quite another where Plaintiff has 
domesticated her entire case in Utah. Thus Plaintiff-Appellee's 
authority and argument are misplaced. 
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H. THIS IS A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION WHERE GOOD PUBLIC 
POLICY SUPPORTS DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S POSITION 
(a) The Trial Court Judge Confirms That This Is A Unique 
Case and That Utah Law Should Be Clarified on the Issue 
In Tr.(Dec.13,1996)at 10:5, counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
stated that he'd like to certify the jurisdiction issues for an 
appeal. The trial court responded at 10:7-17: 
If you'll submit the appropriate order, Counsel, I 
will sign it. Because I think it's something that needs 
to be clarified under Utah law. 
Unfortunately, this case is unique on its facts, and 
I'm surprised, frankly, that we haven't got anything 
better [than MacLean].... And I've made a decision, and 
if I'm wrong, we'll all learn from it. But that's the 
order. 
Thank you, counsel. [Emphasis added]. 
Furthermore, in the Nov. 15, 1996 hearing, at Tr. 5:1, the 
Court stated its reservations to Ex-Wife's assertions through 
counsel that modification must be done in California, if at all: 
I'm not sure, Counsel. It is a concern on my part 
that I have never addressed. I don't know what the law 
is on it,•••• 
It is clear that the Court, and no doubt lawyers, judges, and 
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litigants in Utah generally, could benefit from appellate review 
and clarification of these seemingly contradictory principles—Full 
Faith and Credit on the one hand, and access to Courts in a total 
domestication of a foreign judgment on the other. 
(b) Good Public Policy Suggests That Residents of Utah 
Not Be Foreclosed From Asserting Claims Arising Out Of 
Foreign Cases Brought to Utah Courts And Fully 
Domesticated Here. 
It is one thing to honor foreign decrees through the Full 
Faith and Credit clause to the United States Constitution. No one 
disputes that. 
What Appellee disputes in his Brief is Appellant's proposition 
that if an out-of-state party chooses to bring more than a mere 
enforcement order into a Utah court through whole-case 
domestication, that Utah residents should not be barred from using 
their own courts to argue issues arising from the same case the 
out-of-state plaintiff chooses to wholly domesticate in Utah. Why 
should Mrs. Bankler be permitted to litigate all parts of her case 
in both California and Utah, while Mr. Bankler can only defend the 
Utah case by travelling to California? The logic of Utah law 
accommodating everyone except Utah residents in Utah courts seems 
flawed. This is particularly illogical when Mrs. Bankler, a 
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California resident, chose to domesticate her entire Judgment in 
Utah. Mr. Bankler did not choose to be pulled into additional 
litigation anywhere. Once forced to defend, however, he is barred 
from defending in that very court he is pulled into, and is told 
that if he wishes to modify a fully domesticated Utah case he must 
do so in California while his ex-wife advocates the same issues in 
his home state of Utah. 
In addition to the bad logic and fundamental unfairness, there 
are policy concerns of judicial economy and financial burdens 
inherent to parties in litigating the same issues in the several 
states. Refusal to permit the issues to be tried together in Utah 
where the moving party consents, and defending party resides, does 
not seem like a sound policy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief ("Mrs. Bankler") does not 
accurately and fully respond to the issues raised in this appeal. 
The most obvious evasion involves Mrs. Bankler's blatant assertion 
that the trial court did not address the issue of personal 
jurisdiction and that Defendant-Appellant failed to preserve it on 
appeal, when in fact the Order of Dismissal—the final judgment 
appealed from herein—unequivocally states that "Defendant's 
Modification of the Divorce Decree jls dismissed for lack of subject 
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matter and personal jurisdiction. It is a fact that all 
significant issues, including jurisdiction, have been preserved, 
despite Mrs. Bankler1s assertions contra. 
Perhaps the most significant side-stepping of Mrs. Bankler1s 
responsive brief involves her continued misconstruction of what 
exactly was domesticated in Utah. She chose to domesticate her 
entire Judgment dated December 5, 1991, not just the enforcement 
order dated April 2, 1996. She also sought additional relief here. 
All of the key points in her brief miss this fundamental and 
significant point. Even if her cases and authority support the 
domestication of an enforcement order, they do not support the 
proposition that Mr. Bankler should be barred from asserting 
defenses or modifications after Mrs. Bankler chose to domesticate 
the entire Judgment in Utah. Thus her reliance on the cases and 
statutes she cites do not address the key issues Mr. Bankler raises 
on appeal. 
Finally, good public policy supports allowing Mr. Bankler to 
seek modification of his spousal support order in the Utah court, 
due to changed circumstances now that Mrs. Bankler has forced him 
into court after domesticating her entire Judgment of Dissolution 
in Utah. As this appears to be a case unique on the facts and 
perhaps of first impression, as the trial court suggested, the 
parties are entitled to clear guidance from the appellate courts. 
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Mr. Bankler should be entitled to the affirmative relief he seeks— 
access to his own court to modify the support order after Mrs. 
Bankler has (1) consented to that court and (2) has pulled him into 
that court against his will by domesticating her entire foreign 
Judgment of Dissolution. 
It is respectfully requested that the Court of Appeals reverse 
the district court's denial of Mr. Bankler!s right to assert his 
petition to modify the divorce decree now domesticated in Utah and 
which is, or should be, subject to the same respect as any other 
Utah judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of ^  
1997. 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
u day of November, 
ft 
I do hereby certify that on the 
I mailed two true and correct copies 
1997, 
foregoing o  the above and 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by placing same in the United States Mail, 
first-class postage prepaid, to the following, to wit: 
Ronald L. Read TA/£> J&?f£F& 
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187 North 100 West ///^^J^Vf3^ 
St. George, Utah 84770 ^ 
HUNTSMAN 
for Defendant 
12 
ADDENDUM 
Attachment A: ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
ORIGINAL 
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN - 5677 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
283 West Hilton Drive - Ste. #3 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) 628-2846 
Fax No.: (801) 628-3049 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
DORENA BANKLER, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
JACK BANKLER, 
Defendant. ] 
I ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
I Civil No. 966500506 
Defendant having petitioned the Court for an Order Modifying 
the Decree of Divorce; this matter came on for hearing on 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss on Monday, December 9, 1996. 
Plaintiff did not appear but was represented by counsel, Ronald L. 
Read. Defendant appeared and was represented by counsel Paul R. 
Christensen. Both parties having submitted Memoranda and oral 
argument was given. The following Order is hereby entered by the 
Court: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
1. Defendant's Petition for Modification of the Divorce 
Decree is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter and personal 
1 
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jurisdiction. 
2. The Court has jurisdiction to give full faith and credit 
to the Judgment entered by the California Superior Court which has 
been domesticated in the above-entitled Court. 
Dated this 2 ^f day of J(X ^ , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ronald L. Read 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY HAND DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that on the 24th day of January, 1997, I 
delivered, by hand, a true and correct unsigned copy of the above 
and foregoing STIPULATION AND ORDER OF CONTINUANCE to the 
following, to wit: 
Ronald L. Read 
HUGHES & READ 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 8477 0 
Paul R. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
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I do hereby certify that on the day of 
, 1997, I mailed a true and correct signed copy of the above and 
foregoing STIPULATION AND ORDER OF CONTINUANCE by placing same in 
the United States Mail, first-class postage pre-paid, to the 
following, to wit: 
Ronald L. Read 
HUGHES & READ 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Paul R. Christensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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